Plantinga article

Plantinga On Properly Basic Belief in God

 

 

University of Durham, MA in Philosophy

Module 2 – Philosophy of Religion

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract

Alvin Plantinga’s project to is to rebut the classical foundationalist approach to the rationality of religious belief and establish an alternative methodology under which belief in God may be rationally held. According to Plantinga, classical foundationalism is an inappropriate account for determining whether a belief is properly formed, because it is self-referentially incoherent and fails to address how many beliefs come into being. Beliefs formed in a non-inferential manner, and which do not fulfil the foundationalist criteria are capable of being properly basic and so Plantinga argues, by analogy, are theistic beliefs. However, theistic beliefs formed this way are open to certain objections, notably the Great Pumpkin objection: if theistic belief can be properly basic, why cannot any belief be so? Plantinga counters this by advancing his model of warrant, suggesting that theistic belief is epistemically proper only if it is warranted. To be warranted a belief must be formed by properly functioning noetic equipment aimed at eliciting the truth. Moreover, specifically theistic belief is brought about by a sensus divinitas, that is, a cognitive process which bring about an awareness of God. However, in the absence of evidence for this model, Plantinga’s argument for it is that if God exists, something like his model is probably correct, and in making this move he undermines his the basis of his project. The theist can use Plantinga’s model to support the rationality of his belief but it will do nothing persuade the atheist or agnostic.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I declare that this essay is 5218 words long.

Gary Lorrison

11 Poplar Drive, Durham, DH1 1DR, 0777 376 8241

 

Tutor’s name: Matthew Ratcliffe

Journal Conventions Followed: Analysis

16 February, Epiphany Term, 2003

 

 

Introduction

Alvin Plantinga’s epistemic project is an attempt to show that belief in God may be properly basic, even though it is arrived at in ways that are inconsistent with the classical foundationalist explanation of how rational beliefs are formed, by virtue of such belief being warranted.[1] In this essay, I will attempt to show that while Plantinga’s project is in some ways preferable to a foundationalist account, in that it attempts to provide an account of belief formation that better describes the way believers actually seem to form their beliefs, rather than in the manner a foundationalist might require, his approach is severely problematical because it leads to an account of belief that is entirely subjective in that while it may enable the theist to provide a coherent account of his beliefs, its assumptions are such that the atheist or agnostic will remain entirely unconvinced.

I will initially examine the foundationalist account of belief and Plantinga’s critique of it, which consists, firstly, of an attempt to show that the foundationalist account of belief is self-referentially incoherent, and, secondly, that certain non-religious beliefs, and then by analogy theistic belief, may be arrived at in a non-inferential manner (as the foundationalist would require) and yet be properly basic. I will then go on to show how this is problematic for theistic belief because it appears to open the floodgates to any number of beliefs, exemplified in the famous Great Pumpkin objection. Plantinga’s response to this is to introduce a model whereby theistic belief may by warranted by virtue of a cognitive faculty that, when functioning properly, enables us directly to perceive God - the sensus divinitas. I will consider this account, focusing on the notion of proper function, and conclude that it fails to provide any reason to prefer it over any of the alternative models, such as non-Christian theistic religions, non-theistic religions, or atheism. At best it levels the playing field against atheism by showing there is no reason to suppose that atheism is the preferred position in the absence of evidence for God’s existence.

 

What is the Problem?

 

The first step in Plantinga’s project is to attack the supposition that theistic belief is not epistemically proper if there is a lack of evidence for the existence of God. This problem is rooted in the age-old question concerning the distinction between knowledge and true belief identified by Plato in the Thaetetus. There is a distinction between the truth of God’s existence, which Plantinga calls the de facto question, and whether a believer is within his epistemic rights to believe in God: the de jure question. In this essay we are concerned with the latter[2]. To clarify what I mean by this, suppose I am sitting in my study and form a belief that there is a cat in the adjoining room. I form this belief because I hear a barking noise coming from that room, mistakenly supposing that cats bark. By chance my belief is correct, because there is in fact a cat in that room (as well, presumably, as a dog). However, clearly there is something wrong with my belief, because it is formed in an inappropriate manner. In this instance, I can answer the question concerning the truth of the proposition ‘there is a cat in the adjoining room’, by simply taking going and taking a look. By contrast, this is something that I cannot do with respect to my belief in God, because I cannot just pop up to Heaven and see if He is there. Given this inability to check the truth of the proposition ‘God exists’, what is it that is required for my belief in God to be well formed?

 

Foundationalism

Until recently this question appeared adequately to be dealt with by foundationalism. This is the position commonly assumed by both proponents and opponents of natural theology and is concerned with whether there are good arguments for the existence of God. Foundationalism is based on the premise that to be epistemically proper our beliefs must be justified, and to be justified they must fall into one of two categories. First, there are basic beliefs, which are beliefs arrived at in a direct and non-inferential way and which may be described as follows: -

(F) ‘a proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either self-evident or incorrigible for S (modern foundationalism) or either self-evident or “evident to the senses” (ancient and mediaeval foundationalism)’ (see Plantinga 1981: 49).

 

A paradigmatic example of a properly basic belief in this sense, is the conclusion arrived at by Descartes when contemplating his own existence: ‘I am thinking therefore I exist’. It would appear from this definition that a properly basic belief is a belief that we just cannot help but accept as true no matter how much reflection we bring to bear on the matter.[3]

If a belief is not properly basic, then, to be justified, it must be built upon the foundations of our basic beliefs. Locke’s position as an early foundationalist, summarised by Plantinga, is : “we have a duty to give assent only to that to which we have good reasons” (Plantinga 2000: 87), and we assess these reasons by asking whether not there is sufficient evidence for the belief: per Blanchard, “the principle is simple and sweeping: equate your assent to the evidence” (1974: 401). So, for the foundationalist, a non-basic belief is justified if and only if there are good reasons for it, and these reasons are determined by whether or not there is sufficient evidence.

Natural theology assumes that belief in God is not basic, as it is neither evident, nor incorrigible, nor evident to the senses. Thus, in order to be rational, justification must be sought. Accordingly, a number of proofs of God’s existence have been devised over the centuries, the primary examples of which are the Ontological Argument, the Teleological Argument and the Cosmological Argument.[4] Foundationalist objectors to theistic belief maintain that these arguments are unconvincing, and therefore that belief in God formed on the bases of these arguments is unjustified.[5]

 

Plantinga’s Rejection of Foundationalism

Plantinga seeks to answer the question concerning the epistemic propriety of theistic belief by refusing to accept the premises on which the foundationalist view is based. One of the objections he proposes is logical; another, in my view is more cogent, is ‘broadly inductive’ (1981: 45-47). I will deal with the logical objection first. This objection concerns the status of the proposition (F) above and maintains that it is self-referentially incoherent. If we are foundationalists, then, in order for us to believe (F), (F) must either be basic, or follow from propositions that are basic. He maintains that (F) is clearly not basic, and accepting it as basic would violate the foundationalists’ own criteria for basicality. Therefore, there must be good arguments in favour of (F) built upon propositions that are basic. It is ‘exceedingly hard’ to see how such an argument might be constructed (1981: 49). If this argument is correct, then the foundationalist has no way of justifying his position.

Although this argument does seem problematic for the foundationalist, it is, perhaps, not fatal. The foundationalist might be able to argue that his criteria for knowledge, while not properly basic or following on from basic beliefs, should still be preferred in the absence of any better criteria being advanced. As Gregg says,

 

‘granted, the foundationalist criteria are self-referentially incoherent, indeed the foundationalist has no arguments of any sort by which to prove the validity of these criteria. But that does not mean the foundationalist is wrong. After all, these particular criteria have seemed to make a lot of sense to a lot of people over the years. Perhaps it remains true that the only beliefs that should be accepted as properly basic are those that are either self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses’ (1990: 399).

 

However, this view, too, seems to be vulnerable to attack on exactly the same terms as Plantinga uses for his attack on foundationalism. How do we assess whether the criteria ‘make sense’? It cannot be by virtue of their being basic or built on the foundations of basic belief. What then? Might the foundationalist criteria be some kind of heuristic device? What is it then that would lead us prefer foundational beliefs over other kinds of belief. One answer might be that we could argue inductively that foundationalist beliefs are more reliable than those which are not. However, we are still forced back to the question of how we assess reliability in both cases and moreover, we have to take a view on the reliability of the inductive method. Relying on the truth of induction would surely be an extremely unattractive move for the foundationalist.

In any case, the foundationalist position is further undermined by the second prong in Plantinga’s attack. This is, ironically, itself inductive and it is that the foundationalist approach fundamentally fails to describe how people actually come to form their beliefs. We do not treat our second level beliefs as a series of propositions derived from basic beliefs, of which we accept those that are deductively valid or for which there is sufficient evidence, discarding the rest. This reduces belief formation to a kind of picking and choosing of deductively valid arguments.[6] The reality seems to be that we have no control over a great many of our beliefs: we simply either believe or fail to believe. For instance, I cannot help but believe that this morning I bought a newspaper and a loaf of bread from the corner shop.

Furthermore, some beliefs, such as belief in God, are formed in a non-inferential way. While some of us may come to believe in God by virtue of, say, the Argument from Design, for many, and probably most, believers, God impinges on their lives in a direct, non-inferential way. Indeed, Aquinas argues that this is true for all of us: “To know in a general and confused way that God exists is implanted in us by nature”(I, q. 2 a.1, ad. 1 ), and Locke, despite being a foundationalist, says something similar: “We may as well doubt of our own being, as we can whether any revelation from God be true” (IV, xvi, 14, p. 383 ). It is not merely belief in God that fails to fulfil the foundationalist criteria. Very few of our beliefs

regarding any subject whatever, are formed in this way. Plantinga gives examples of such beliefs as: -

 

(1)   I see a tree,

(2)   I had breakfast this morning,

(3)   That person is angry (1981: 44).

 

None of these beliefs are held by virtue of deductive propositions and yet they are basic and properly basic. So, perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs and beliefs ascribing mental states to other persons, may be properly basic, and certainly (2) and (3), if not (1), appear to fall outside the foundationalist criteria for basicality. Plantinga then draws an analogy between these beliefs (which I shall call paradigmatic beliefs) and the following beliefs concerning God that may also be arrived at in a direct non-inferential manner, suggesting that these too may be properly basic: -

 

(4)   God is speaking to me,

(5)   God created all this,

(6)   God disapproves of what I have done,

(7)   God forgives me,

(8)  God is to be thanked and praised (1981: 46-47).

 

This move needs a little unpacking. First, we are invited to suppose that the paradigmatic beliefs are indeed properly basic; second, that beliefs (4) to (8) are properly analogous to the paradigmatic beliefs. Before we start, it is noteworthy that the basic beliefs identified are not generalised propositions such as ‘there are trees’, ‘the world is more than five minutes old’, and ‘there are other minds’. Similarly, none of the theistic beliefs is simply ‘God exists’. The general beliefs, though, are self-evidently entailed by the specific instances given in the examples. That is, I cannot believe (4) to (8) without also believing that God exists.

However, we do at least need the concept of ‘a tree’ before we can meaningfully say ‘I see a tree’. So, there is a sense in which the belief ‘there are trees’ is more fundamental than the belief ‘I see a tree’, and yet ‘I see a tree’ is what appears to us directly. How we resolve this paradox is unclear, and probably involves an investigation into the mechanics of how we form beliefs and come to make generalisations from specific instances of perception. A similar difficulty is encountered when we start ascribing mental states to others. I do not intend to address this here, but merely note that it is an unresolved difficulty.

Whatever the answer, it does appear to be that when we form any of the beliefs (1) to (8), we do not form them inferentially at all, at least as far as we are consciously aware. We do not, for example, reason in the following way: “I see a patch of green in the shape of a circle above a vertical rectangular brown patch. These shapes and colours correspond to similar patches of shape and colour that I have seen in the past, and which I have learned are called trees. What I am looking at is probably therefore a tree.” Instead, we just simply see trees in a basic way.

 

Comparing Basic Beliefs and Religious Belief

The mere fact that a belief is arrived at in a non-inferential manner is not sufficient to establish it as properly basic, though. What is it about the paradigmatic beliefs that supposedly makes them so? And do the same qualities apply to the theistic belief? Gregg (1983, 1990) has identified three areas where he supposes there are disanalogies between the paradigmatic beliefs and theistic beliefs. This raises two questions: - are they really disanalogies? And if they are, do they undermine Plantinga’s notion that theistic belief may be properly basic? I will briefly discuss these disanalogies and then examine certain responses offered by McLeod (1987). I will suggest that despite McLeod’s criticisms, Gregg’s disanalogies do pose some problems for Plantinga’s position which he must address, but they in no way fatally undermine him. The disanalogies offered by Gregg are: -

 

(1)   There is a psychological benefit to theistic belief that is absent from the paradigmatic beliefs (1990: 391-392);

 

(2)   If our noetic equipment is working correctly then the paradigmatic beliefs are universal (anyone whose eyes, visual cortex and so on are all functioning properly, standing in front of a tree, could truthfully say ‘I see a tree’), whereas belief in God is not (1990: 393-394);

 

(3)   The paradigmatic beliefs can be confirmed by recourse to outside evidence, whereas the theistic beliefs cannot (1990: 394-398).

 

In response to (1), McLeod argues that there may be circumstances where there is also a psychological benefit to holding the paradigmatic beliefs (1987: 5). He gives as an example a situation in which a boss asks an employee whether he has posted an urgent letter. The employee consults his memory and seems to remember posting the letter. Surely his memory may be biased because he wants it to be the case that he has posted the letter? Gregg’s response (1990) is that this is precisely the sort of situation in which we would suppose our perceptual systems might be malfunctioning due to this supposed psychological pressure and so we would treat the reliability of that memory with caution.

However, surely if we Gregg’s response here, then given the myriad of factors that might affect us during our life, it seems possible that every one of our perceptual beliefs might be subject to a similar sort of psychological influence, in which case we would have to treat all of our memory beliefs with caution. Accordingly, I do not believe that Gregg’s response to McLeod works. However, I believe the disanalogy is still valid because I am not sure that McLeod’s example is plausible. Doubt about whether I had posted a letter for my boss, might lead me to lie, but it is not obvious to me that it would affect my memory of the event. It is at best merely a possibility requiring further investigation.

Another response, offered by McLeod, to this disanalogy is that there is no psychological benefit to believing, say, ‘God is angry with me’ or ‘God disapproves of what I have done’. Gregg reply says that while this is true, such beliefs occur in a larger context in which the believer believes in God, and that by virtue of his belief his life acquires a deeper meaning and purpose. So you might believe, ‘God is angry with me’, but you cannot believe this without also believing ‘God exists’, and if you believe God exists, you may well believe that he if is angry with you it is ultimately because he loves you. The problem for Gregg here is that in order to support this argument, he is relying on one or more inferential, not basic, beliefs to draw the analogy. The belief ‘God exists’, is not a basic belief.  So his reply does not appear to work.

Furthermore, how does he answer the theist who has formed the basic belief that as a result of his sins he is going to Hell? Surely, there can be no psychological benefit in holding that belief.

 

If I am correct that McLeod’s first objection to Gregg’s point is mistaken then there is a disanalogy here. However, it only undermines Plantinga’s position if he wants to make a positive case for theistic belief. If all Plantinga wants to do is make the defensive case for the theist, he can concede that ‘yes, it may be the case that there is a psychological benefit to belief in God, but there is no reason to assume that that is the reason we do believe in God.’ If Plantinga wants to make the positive case then he needs to show that belief in God is as a result of noetic structures aimed at seeking the truth. He does attempt this and I will discuss this below when I talk about warrant.

 

In response to (2) above, McLeod proposes that there are first and second levels of belief. A first level belief would be ‘I see a tree’ whereas a second level belief  might be ‘the leaves of this tree turn a beautiful red each fall!’ or ‘this tree is not worth all the effort I spend on raking up its leaves’ (1990: 393). It is these second level beliefs that are not universal, and since theistic belief is not universal, it must be a second level belief. I do not intend to address his arguments here because I do not believe I need to. By invoking second level beliefs in this way, McLeod has moved away from basic beliefs in the sense that we are talking about. If so, we do, again, have a genuine disanalogy, and therefore a potential problem for Plantinga. Plantinga’s response is to attack the notion that underlies this analogy: that the beliefs are universal given proper functioning of our noetic equipment. That is, on his account of theistic belief, if our noetic equipment is functioning properly, belief in God would be universal. Again, I will be deal with further in my discussion of warrant.

 

The third disanalogy that Gregg identifies is that the paradigmatic beliefs can be confirmed by recourse to outside evidence, whereas the theistic beliefs cannot (1990: 394-398). For example, suppose I am not sure that I have had breakfast, but when I go into the kitchen I can see dishes in the sink and eggs missing from box. I remember that the dishes were done and the box of eggs was full the night before. I can use this evidence to help confirm my memory. McLeod answers that in doing this one is using the very cognitive function that one is questioning to confirm it, a clearly circular move, and so the confirmation is not reliable. Gregg agrees that the confirmation relies on the same cognitive procedure, but argues that it is possible to stand outside (in this case) one’s memory to a extent sufficient to enable it to be a reliable check. In a real life situation, this is exactly what we would do to confirm out memories.

So has Gregg established a relevant disanalogy here? Yes, but only in a trivial sense, the reason being that, as I have outlined in the introduction, Plantinga’s whole epistemic project is to find out under what circumstances it is proper to form a belief when it is impossible to check the truth of that belief. In fact not only is this is a disanalogy, but it is a necessary disanalogy for Plantinga’s project to even get off the ground. The very question we are examining is the distinction between beliefs that we can check and those that we cannot.

 

Objections to Plantinga’s Position

If we now allow that theistic beliefs might be not only basic but properly basic, what implications does this have? One of the main criticisms of this account is that if correct, any belief may be properly basic. If I can believe in God in a basic way then what is to stop me from treating as properly basic my belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Or that Santa Claus comes visiting every Christmas Eve? What is to stop the Yorkshire Ripper claiming that God was speaking to him telling him to kill his victims? We would not want to allow that these beliefs are properly basic. But what is it that prevents any belief, no matter how outrageous, from being so?

We do not have to ask this question merely concerning outrageous beliefs. Arguably the Great Pumpkin is something of a straw man (no pun intended!), it being the case that there is no epistemic community seriously advocating such a belief. Rose Christian suggests a more robust opponent: that of Hindu theology (1992: 568-570). In Hinduism “it is possible for individuals who follow prescribed paths of meditation to achieve states of consciousness characterised as direct apprehension of what is truly the case about reality”(1992: 568). So, a Hindu can treat his beliefs as basic in the same way as the theist. How are we to decide between these competing beliefs.

Plantinga’s initial response to this is that he does not need to show what is required for a belief to be rational (1981: 48-49). By analogy, he suggests that someone who rejects the logical positivists’ verifiability criteria for meaningfulness, but who cannot substitute his own criteria, is not committed to the meaningfulness of “twas brillig; and the slithy toves did gyre and gymble in the wabe”. The fact that he has rejected the foundationalist criteria for basicality does not mean that he is committed to just any belief being properly basic. But how to separate the wheat from the chaff? Without advocating a positive case he is in danger of challenge from serious competing non-monotheistic belief systems such as Hinduism, and as soon as he makes a similar case not just for theistic belief but for specifically Christian belief, he is open to challenge from the Judaism and Islam. If all he aspires to is to show that theistic (and Christian) belief is rational, he must allow that certain other beliefs may also be so. However, by not advancing a positive case he is open to another challenge. How can two competing and incompatible beliefs, such as Christianity and Hinduism, be properly basic?

Plantinga takes up the challenge by setting up a criterion by which we can assess whether a basic belief is properly basic: the notion of warrant.

 

Warrant and Belief in God

For Plantinga a belief is warranted (and epistemically proper) when it is formed by the proper functioning of noetic equipment aimed at eliciting the truth (2000: Ch. 5). Criticism of a belief as irrational, unreasonable or unjustified amounts to an allegation that it is formed either as a result of malfunctioning cognitive processes, or that the belief forming process is aimed at something other than truth.[7] On this account there are three elements to warranted theistic belief that we have to consider: an account of proper function, the notion that our noetic equipment is aimed at eliciting the truth rather than some other quality, and the notion that this equipment is capable of perceiving God.

A belief has warrant only if it is produced by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly. Just as our other organs can function properly or improperly, so can our cognitive processes. For instance, I know that my heart is functioning properly if my resting pulse rate is about 60 beats per minute. If it is 160 beats per minute and fluctuating wildly then I know something is wrong. Plantinga supposes that the notion of proper functioning is related to that of a design plan: however, talk of a design plan is probably best avoided except in very loose terms, as design plan might seem to imply a designer, which clearly begs the question. However, evolution by natural selection is also capable of explaining how an object may come to look as if it has been designed, without invoking a designer.[8] In Plantinga’s model therefore, it is necessary to suppose a belief forming mechanism which, when functioning properly, causes us to form beliefs such as (4) to (8) above.

Objectors to theism may take the opposite view. For Marx, theistic belief is a result of cognitive dysfunction. His famous view is that, “religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people”(1964: 41-42). For Plantinga, a properly functioning cognitive faculty with respect to theistic belief is one that produces true beliefs in us.

While intuitively we may feel that our belief forming processes are aimed at the truth, it is not necessarily so. A Darwinian interpretation of belief formation might suggest that our  beliefs are primarily aimed at survival and facilitating reproduction, and it is only accidental if they happen to find the truth as well. For instance, a soldier in battle might form a belief in his own invincibility. This is clearly a false belief, but it may increase the chances of his survival. Similarly, a man might overestimate his abilities leading to an superabundance of self-confidence, which while unjustified, might enhance his chances of finding a mate.

For Freud belief in God falls into this category. Belief in God is an illusion: a belief that arises from the mechanism of wish fulfilment. He says, “the terrifying impressions of helplessness in childhood aroused the need for protection – for protection through love – which was provided by the father; and the recognition that this helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful one.” i.e. God (1961: 30). For Freud, then, religious belief is produced by cognitive processes that are working properly but not aimed at the truth. In order to maintain that belief in God is epistemically proper, Plantinga proposes that our cognitive processes with respect to theistic belief are aimed at truth. But how do we know this? Since he is, by his own epistemic model, prevented from adducing evidence, he must use alternative means, and what he does is introduce the so-called sensus divinitas. This is the third requirement in Plantinga’s model and

 harks back to Aquinas, who claimed that to know “in a general or confused way that God

exists is implanted in us by nature”. Similarly, Calvin said,

 
“[a] man of sound judgment will always be sure that a sense of divinity which can never be effaced is engraved upon men’s minds. Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who though they struggle furiously are unable to extricate themselves from the fear of God, is abundant testimony that this conviction, namely that there is some God, is naturally inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow”( I, iii, 3: 46 ).

 

In addition to the awareness of God’s existence, the sensus divinitas can bring about beliefs (4) to (8) outlined above. Plantinga maintains that these believes simply arise within us. They are occasioned by circumstances; they are not conclusions from them. In this regard, the sensus divinitas resembles perception, memory, and a priori belief. We can now see how the outstanding disanalogy identified by Gregg is countered - that is, the lack of universality of theistic belief. In this model, knowledge of God is “compromised, weakened and reduced by sin and its consequences” (2000: 184). So, according to this model, it is the unbeliever that displays an epistemic malfunction: failure to believe is caused by a dysfunction of the sensus divinitas. This might explain why not all of us are believers, although the model might require certain ad hoc modifications to account for sinful believers and virtuous non-believers.

 

Consequences of Plantinga’s account

On this model, then, theistic belief produced by the sensus divinitas is basic and, for  Plantinga, properly basic. The believer feels justified in holding his belief in a basic way. He is within his epistemic rights and he is not violating any epistemic duties in holding his belief:-

 

“Suppose you think about the matter carefully and at length, considering the [Freud and Marx] complaints and all the rest but it still seems clear or obvious (perhaps even overwhelmingly so) that there is such a person as God: how could someone sensibly claim that you were being irresponsible or derelict with respect to some epistemic duty? That would be a hard saying indeed” (2000: 178).

 

However, it is difficult to see how this assessment would prevent someone such as the Yorkshire Ripper from making a similar assessment with respect to the voices in his head?

How, then, are we to assess Plantinga’s model? For example, how do we know that our theistic beliefs are produced as a result of cognitive processes aimed at eliciting the truth? Why should we think that it is the unbeliever that is suffering from a cognitive malfunction and not the believer? Why should we think that there is a sensus divinitas which is present in all of us and yet malfunctions in unbelievers?

Plantinga himself tells us. He claims that if theistic belief is true, then something like this model is probably correct (because if true, a properly functioning sensus divinitas would be aimed at finding the truth). Accordingly, there is no sensible challenge to the warrant of theistic belief that is not also a challenge to its truth.

The question then becomes ‘is Plantinga’s model, or something like it, correct’? If it is, then belief in God is warranted. If it is not, then it isn’t. So, “what you properly take to be rational, at least in the sense of warranted, depends on the sort of metaphysical and religious stance you adopt” (2000: 190).  It would appear to be, not an epistemological problem, but an ontological or metaphysical dispute. One implication of this seems to be that in order then to suggest that theistic belief is unwarranted it is necessary to establish the non-existence of God – a harder task than establishing the irrationality of religious belief. But by parity of reasoning, is not the atheist is entitled to ask the theist to establish the truth of God’s existence?

In any event, surely there is a major flaw in this move? By linking this model to the truth of theistic belief we have removed the very reason for undertaking this approach in the first place. Remember that we were trying to establish under what circumstances a belief is epistemically proper in circumstances where we are unable to check its truth. If the answer is, ‘it’s probably warranted if it’s true’, then we are no further forward. Plantinga has offered an account that will appeal to the believer,  because on his own terms, the believer is entitled to say that his belief is warranted. However, equally, the unbeliever, since he adopts a different metaphysical stance, is entitled to say that the believer’s belief is unwarranted. If this is correct then Plantinga’s model does nothing to advance the debate between theists and atheists.

Gary Lorrison

 

 

 

Department of Philosophy

University of Durham

garylorrison@aol.com

 

 

 

                                              

References

 

Aquinas, T., Saint. 1954. Summa Theologiae. Tr. and ed. By A. M. Fairweather. London: SCM

Blanchard, B. 1974. Reason and Belief. London: Allen and Unwin.

Calvin. J. 1979. Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House.

Christian, R.A. 1992. Plantinga, Epistemic Permissiveness, and Metaphysical Pluralism. Religious Studies D 28(4): 553-573

Davies, B. 1993. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dawkins, R. 1986. The Blind Watchmaker. New York: Norton

Descartes, R . 1993. Discourses on Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences, Part IV in Musgrave, A. Common Sense, Science and Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Freud, S. 1961 The Future of an Illusion. Tr. and ed. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton. Originally published as Die Zukunft einer Illusion (Leipzig: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1927)

Gregg, R. 1983. Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14: 123-127.

Gregg, R. 1990. The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God. Religious Studies 26: 389-401

Hick, J. 1970. Arguments for the Existence of God. London: Macmillan

Locke,  J. 1947. An Essay concerning Human Understanding, abr. and ed. by Raymond Wilburn. London: J.M. Dent

Marx, K. and Engels, F. 1964. On Religion tr. Reinhold Niebuhr. Chico Calif.: Scholar’s Press

McLeod, M. 1987. The Analogy Argument for the Proper Basicality of Belief in God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21: 3-20.

McLeod, M. 1988. Can Belief in God Be Confirmed? Religious Studies 24: 311-23.

Plantinga, A. 1981. Is Belief in God Properly Basic? Nous: 41-51.

Plantinga, A. 1979. Is Belief in God Rational? Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C Delaney. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Plantinga, A. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Plato. 1980. Theatetus. New York: Garland Pub.

Priest, G. 2000. Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Russell, B. 1957. The Existence of God – a Debate Between Bertrand Russell and Father F. C. Copleston, SJ. Why I Am Not A Christian, 133-153. London: Routledge.

 

---

[1] See Plantinga (1981) for an early account of how belief in God might be properly basic, and Plantinga (2000) for a further development of these ideas, particularly the notion of warrant.

[2] There is also a further distinction between beliefs that have the status of knowledge and beliefs that have a lesser status, which Locke calls opinion beliefs (IV, xvii, 2: 387).

[3] The question of the relationship between such beliefs and truth will be addressed in the discussion on warrant below.

[4] These arguments come in many varieties, are well rehearsed, and I do not intend to set them out here. For more, see, for example, Davies: 1993 and Hick: 1970.

[5] See, for example, Russell (1957) for a refutation of the Arguments from Contingency, Religious Experience, and Moral Necessity. See Priest 2000: 94-98 for a refutation of the Argument from Design as commonly formulated. These refutations implicitly assume foundationalism of some kind.

[6] What view should I take of Andrew Wiles proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem, which I’m sure is deductively valid but which stretches to hundreds of pages. Is it really only reasonable for me to believe that it has been proved if I can follow every mathematical step?

[7] For a full account of Plantinga’s arguments concerning warrant see Plantinga 2000: Chapters 3 – 6.

[8] For an account of how natural selection may make evolutionary changes appear like design see, for example, Dawkins 1986: Chapters 2-3.